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How Reliable Are Recession
Prediction Models?
By Andrew J. Filardo
T
he U.S. economy continues to advance
briskly, defying forecasts of more moder-
ategrowth.BeginninginMarch1991,the
current expansion has become the longest peace-
time expansion on record and is less than a year
away from becoming the longest in U.S. history.
To the surprise of some observers, economic
growth has been particularly robust late in the
expansion. In fact, over the last three years growth
has averaged 4 percent annually, and indicators
ofgrowthforthefirsthalfof1999shownosigns
of significant slowing.
Despite these positive signs, few analysts believe
the expansion can go on forever. As the expansion
continues to age, economists will increasingly be
called on to predict the next recession. Recession
prediction models may help them gauge the like-
lihood of imminent recession.
Thisarticleexaminesthereliabilityoffivepop-
ularrecessionpredictionmodels.Thefirstsection
reviews each models theoretical strengths and
weaknessesinpredictingrecessions.Thesecond
section evaluates how well these models have
givenadvancewarningofpastrecessions.Perfor-
mance is measured both with recently released
data as well as the data originally available to
analysts.Thearticleconcludesthatthesemodels
have demonstrated some ability in the past to
predict recessions. When judiciously interpreted,
the models can help resolve uncertainty about
the possibility of future recession.
I. FIVE RECESSION PREDICTION
MODELS
While a recession is commonly understood to
be a widespread and prolonged decline in eco-
nomic activity, using a model to predict reces-
sions requires a more precise definition. One
popular definition of recession is a consecutive
2-quarter decline in GDP.
1 The appeal of this
definition stems from the fact that GDP is one of
the broadest measures of economic activity. It is
hard to imagine a widespread decline in eco-
nomic activity without a decline in GDP.
Another definition of recession comes from
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cle is on the banks Website at www.kc.frb.org.recession as a broad decline in aggregate eco-
nomic activity (which is measured as a common
movement in output, income, employment, and
trade), usually lasting from six months to a year,
and marked by widespread contractions in many
sectors of the economy. The NBER explicitly
shuns the GDP definition because it considers
GDP to be too narrow a measure of economic
activitytoreliablydaterecessions.
2Nevertheless,
declines in GDP are closely correlated to reces-
sion periods as denoted by the NBER (Chart 1).
Many analysts use specialized models to predict
the onset of recession. These models are useful
primarily because the behavior of the economy
during periods of transition between expansion
andrecessionisfundamentallydifferentthanwhen
recession is not imminent (Hymans). In other
words,specialtimessuchasturningpointsinthe
business cycle call for special models. More-
over, empirical evidence lends support to this
view. During expansions when recessions are
not a threat, forecasters tend to rely on large-scale
econometric models to chart the future of the
economy.Itiswellknown,however,thataround
turning points in economic activity, these models
can produce large forecasting errors (Braun
and Zarnowitz). As a consequence, when an
expansion might be nearing an end, small-scale
forecasting models can play a critical, if not a
dominant, role in predicting future economic
activity (Diebold and Rudebusch 1989).
3 This
section describes five of these popular business
cycle models: simple rules of thumb using the
Conference Boards composite index of leading
indicators (CLI), Neftçis probability model of
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Chart 1
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basedmodeloftheprobabilityofrecessioncalled
a Probit model, a GDP forecasting model, and a
recession prediction model recently proposed by
Stock and Watson. The appendix provides some
technical details.
Simple rules of thumb using the CLI
Simple rules of thumb based on the composite
indexofleadingindicatorshavelongbeenusedto
predict recessions. The rules have appeal partly
because the CLI has been carefully designed to
provideadvancewarningofrecessions.
4Business
cycle researchers, especially those associated with
theNBER,haveporedoverreamsofdatathrough
the decades to construct an index with the princi-
palpurposeofpredictingthebeginningsandends
of recessions. The ten components of the index
have six characteristics that should make them
good leading indicators: 1) conformity to the
general business cycle, 2) consistent timing as a
leadingindicator,3)economicsignificancebased
on accepted business cycle theories, 4) statistical
reliability of data collection, 5) smooth month-to-
month changes, and 6) reasonably prompt publi-
cation of the data.
5
CLI rules of thumb also have popular appeal
because they are easy to use and understand. One
popular rule signals an imminent recession if the
CLI falls in two consecutive months. Another
rule requires three consecutive monthly declines.
Compared to the 2-month rule, the 3-month rule
should provide a stronger warning of imminent
recession, thereby producing fewer false signals
ofrecession.Falsesignalsariseinarecessionpre-
diction model when it signals an imminent reces-
sion that does not occur. However, the 3-month
rule gives less advance warning.
6
Philip Klein and Michael Niemira offered a
slight refinement to the simple CLI rules of thumb
tostrengthentherecessionsignalwithoutincreas-
ing the number of consecutive declines. Because
it is possible that a few consecutive but small
declinesintheCLImightfalselysignaltheonset
of recession, Klein and Niemira added a threshold
criterion to the simple rule. The modified rules
requiretwoorthreemonthsofCLIdeclinesofat
least 1.3 percent.
7 This extra criterion should
help filter out insignificant declines in the CLI,
thereby reducing the likelihood of false signals
without necessarily lengthening the lead time in
correctly identifying recessions.
Neftçi model
Salih Neftçi sought to improve on the simple
CLI rules of thumb by developing a formal sta-
tistical model of the probability of recession.
Neftçis model converts monthly observations
of the CLI into a probability of imminent
recession. When the estimated probability of
recession exceeds a threshold value, such as 95
percent, the model flashes a signal of an immi-
nent recession.
Neftçis model may outperform the CLI rules
of thumb because it makes better use of past
information in the CLI. Neftçis model provides
a way to exploit early, often sporadic, recessionary
signals that would not be strong enough to trig-
ger the simple CLI rules of thumb. In other
words, advance warning of a recession may
become available well before the signal is suffi-
ciently strong to cause the CLI to fall for several
consecutive months. As a result, the Neftçi
model is potentially able to increase the lead
time in spotting recessions. Moreover, by being
able to take account of a longer history of CLI
datathantheCLIrules,theNeftçimodelmaybe
able to generate clearer signals of recession and
thus reduce the number of false signals.
Neftçis model offers several other theoretical
advantages over the basic CLI rules of thumb.
First, Neftçis model is sufficiently flexible to
incorporate different beliefs about how reces-
sions start. For example, if an analyst believes
that expansions can die of old age, the analyst
can modify the Neftçi model to reflect this
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porated into CLI rules of thumb. Second, the
Neftçimodelcanbeusedtoevaluatetheabilityof
variables other than the CLI to predict reces-
sion. For example, Giela Fredman and Michael
Niemirausedthismodeltoevaluatetheseparate
components of the CLI as well as a list of financial
variables.
8 Even though Neftçis model allows
someflexibilityinassessingvariouscyclicalindi-
cators, the model must evaluate the predictive
power of one indicator at a time.
Probit model
The Probit model, recently proposed by Arturo
Estrella and Frederic Mishkin, improves on the
Neftçi model by allowing an analyst to assess the
importance of multiple indicators simultaneously.
Using a regression-based framework, the Probit
model generates a probability of future recession
from information in a set of leading indicators.
The closer the probability is to 0, the less likely
the economy will be in a recession at some future
date; the closer the probability is to 1, the more
likely there will be a recession. These probabili-
ties can be easily used to predict the turning point
from expansion to recession. When the probability
of recession rises above 50 percent, the economy
is more likely to be headed toward recession than
remaining in expansion; thus a business cycle
turning point is signaled. Moreover, the Probit
model offers a more precise probability assess-
ment of future recession than the Neftçi model.
The Probit models probability helps predict a
recession at a particular forecast horizon, while
the Neftçi model simply gives a likelihood of
recession sometime in the future.
Because Estrella and Mishkin and others have
shown that financial market indicators such as
interest rates can be reliable recession predictors,
the Probit model used in this article combines
both the CLI and financial indicators.
9 In particu-
lar, the model includes information on the Trea-
sury yield spread (10-year Treasury bond yield
less the 3-month Treasury bill yield), corporate
bondyieldspread(AaabondyieldlessBaabond
yield), Standard and Poors 500 stock returns,
and the CLI. The Treasury yield spread usually
narrows before recessions because it signals rel-
atively poor investment prospects in the future
and tighter short-term credit conditions.
10 The
credit spread often widens before downturns,
reflecting the tendency of risky firms to become
disproportionately more risky during periods of
weak activity. In addition, investors tolerances
for risk tend to fall as they adjust portfolios
toward safer assets. The Standard and Poors
500 stock return is also in the model because the
stock market often falls significantly prior to the
onset of recession.
11 Such declines can reflect
expectations of lower corporate earnings, higher
financing costs of external funds, and less wealth
to sustain consumption growth, especially for
durable goods. Finally, the CLI is included to
incorporate nonfinancial indicators of recessions.
To the extent that both the CLI and financial
indicators deserve weight in predicting reces-
sions, the Probit model helps to improve on
some of the shortcomings of the CLI rules of
thumb and the Neftçi model.
The Probit model offers two other advantages
over the CLI rules of thumb and the Neftçi
model. First, the Probit model allows the analyst
to create new composite indexes of leading
indicators of recession. The models regression
format can be used to evaluate any group of can-
didateleadingindicators,oneatatimeorjointly.
The estimated regression coefficients are opti-
mal weights for the leading index, where the
weights are optimal in the sense that they give
the best chance of forecasting future recessions.
Second, the Probit model allows the business
cycleanalysttoidentifythemostinformativeset
of recession indicators for a given forecast hori-
zon. It is quite possible that some indicators are
more useful at short horizons than at long hori-
zons, and vice versa.
The Probit model has two potential drawbacks.
First, because the Probit model is designed to pre-
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model may miss recessions that exhibit unusual
lead times. Historically, the lead times across
recessions have been quite variable, raising the
possibility that results from the Probit model may
be unreliable. Second, as with any regression
framework, the Probit model may be subject to
the statistical problem of overfitting. If an analyst
searches over a large set of variables that in truth
have no predictive content for recessions, there is
agoodchancethatsomeofthevariableswillspu-
riously appear to explain the past. A recession
prediction model that incorporates such spurious
variables will not forecast well.
12
GDP forecasting model
The GDP forecasting model is also a regression-
basedframeworkbuttriestopredictrecessionsby
forecasting consecutive declines in GDP. The
GDP forecasting model is specified as a simple
multiequationregressionmodel,morecommonly
referred to as a vector autoregression, or VAR. In
this model, the growth rate of real GDP depends
on past growth rates of real GDP, past growth
rates of the CLI, past changes in the interest rate
spread defined as the 10-year Treasury yield less
the 3-month Treasury yield, and past changes in
the 3-month Treasury yield. To spot future reces-
sions, the model produces GDP forecasts. A fore-
castoftwoconsecutivequarterlydeclinesinGDP
is taken as a recession signal.
As a regression-based framework, the GDP fore-
casting model has many of the advantages of the
Probit model. Any variable that helps forecast
GDPisapotentialcandidateinthemodel,andthe
model can be specialized to focus on any forecast
horizon of interest. The GDP forecasting approach
may also be attractive because analysts can choose
any model that produces forecasts of GDPnot
just the particular forecasting model described
above.
The GDP forecasting model is not without
problems. First, it has some of the unstable lead
time and overfitting problems of the Probit model.
Second, the GDP forecasting model predicts
recessions using a 2-quarter GDP decline defini-
tion,whichisarguablyonlyanapproximationof
the NBERs definition of recession.
13 Finally,
the GDP forecasting equation used in this article
can be viewed as a small-scale version of a
large-scale forecasting model. Like large-scale
models, the GDP forecasting model may be sus-
ceptible to a degradation in forecasting perfor-
mance around turning points in the business
cycle.
Stock-Watson model
James Stock and Mark Watson (1989) devel-
oped a recession prediction model that tries to
capture the institutional process of the NBERs
Business Cycle Dating Committee. The difficulty
in mimicking the Dating Committees decision
processisthattheCommitteeshunssimplenumer-
ical rules for dating recessions, but a model that
produces probabilities of recession must have
numerical rules. Stock and Watson compensate
for the models need for rules by formulating
elaborate rules that may be sufficiently flexible
tocapturethebehavioroftheDatingCommittee.
The Stock-Watson model is similar in spirit to
the GDP forecasting model but differs in two
important ways. First, instead of GDP, the model
uses a broader measure of economic activity.
Specifically, Stock and Watson use a coincident
index of economic activity which is a weighted
average of industrial production, real personal
income less transfer payments, real sales in
manufacturing and trade, and total employee-
hours in nonagricultural establishments. This
index is forecast with seven leading indicators:
new private housing building permits, durable
goods industries unfilled orders, trade-weighted
exchange rate, part-time employment because
of slack work, 10-year constant maturity Trea-
sury bond yield, credit interest rate spread, and
term interest rate spread. Second, a recession
probability measure, called the Experimental
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forecasts from the model with an elaborate
up-and-down pattern that could be consistent
with what the NBER might actually define as a
recession.
14 The published index measures the
probability that the economy will be in recession
in six months.
15
The model has experienced growing appeal in
the 1990s, reflecting several attractive aspects of
the model. First, like the Probit model, the Stock-
Watsonmodelputsconsiderableweightonfinan-
cial variables, reflecting the view that financial
variables such as interest rates provide useful
forward-looking macroeconomic information.
16
However, the Stock-Watson model uses the finan-
cial variables in a different way than the Probit
model. Rather than directly predict turning points
from expansion to recession, the Stock-Watson
model uses the variables to predict future eco-
nomic activity. Second, the Stock-Watson model
was developed on the basis of a state-of-the-art
and exhaustive specification search. The choice
of model specification, including the selection of
variables,hasbeensubjecttoasearchacrosshun-
dreds,ifnotthousands,ofalternatives.Finally,an
up-to-date version of the recession index is readily
available through the NBER. Stock and Watson
regularly update their model as new data become
available and publish the results in a monthly
newsletter.
The key drawback of the published recession
index is its narrow focus. The published index
represents the probability that the economy will
be in recession in six months, not one to five
months or longer than seven months. While, in
theory, the model could be modified to produce
implicationsaboutrecessionsatdifferenthorizons,
there is no simple way for analysts to evaluate the
given model at different horizons. Moreover, the
sophisticationofthemodelhasbeenaformidable
hurdle for analysts who want to check its robust-
ness. As a result, ongoing research on the model
has been limited, thus leaving unresolved a fair
amount of uncertainty about its potential.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The previous section described how the five
business cycle modelssimple rules of thumb
using the CLI, Neftçis model, Probit model,
GDP forecasting model, and Stock-Watson
modeloffer different ways to predict reces-
sions.Nomatterhowsoundthetheoreticaljusti-
fication of the models, their value comes from
their ability to accurately predict recessions
with sufficient advance warning. This section
assesses each models historical forecast perfor-
mance using two different kinds of data sets
that interest business cycle analysts and policy-
makers. The first data set consists of the recently
published data series, which in many cases have
beenrevisedsubstantiallyovertime.Thesecond
data seta real-time data setincludes the origi-
nally published versions of the data series. This
data set reflects information that policymakers
had at the time decisions were made. This sec-
tion concludes by evaluating what the models
arenowsayingaboutthepossibilityofimminent
recession.
Measures of forecasting performance
The forecasting performance of each model is
examined using two measures: timeliness and
accuracy.Timelinessmeasureshowfarinadvance
a model signals the start of a recessionin
particular, the number of months or quarters





the model match actual outcomes. A model is
accurate if it predicts an imminent recession and
one occurs, or if it correctly predicts a continua-
tion of expansion. While conceptually simple,
the criterion is quite complicated in practice
due to twotypesofpredictionerrors.Themodel
errsifitpredictsacontinuationofexpansionand
recession begins (missed signal), or if it pre-
dictsimminentrecessionandnoneoccurs(false
40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYsignal).Whetheronetypeoferrorismoreimportant
thantheotherdependsonhowthemodelsareused.
In a monetary policy context, missed signals
are certainly costly because accurate advance
warning of recession allows policymakers to ease
monetary conditions to mitigate the severity and
duration of recessions. Advance warning is par-
ticularly important because monetary policy
affects the economy with long and variable lags.
False signals are more difficult to assess than
missed signals because some false signals may
not be viewed as a blemish on a models perfor-
mance. In fact, some false signals of recession
may indicate successful policy. For example, a
signal of imminent recession may spur policy
actions that pull the economy from the brink of
recession. Distinguishing signals of recessions
which were avoided from those signals that are
simply false requires some consideration of the
economic conditions surrounding the signal.
Historical performance using the
recently revised data
Using the recently revised data, the five mod-
els show some ability to provide advance warn-
ing of recession.
CLI rules of thumb. The CLI rules of thumb
tended to predict recessions one-half year prior
to their onset, highlighting the usefulness of the
model (Table 1). On average, the basic 2-month
rule had the longest lead time of ten months,
while the more conservative 3-month rule with
threshold spotted recessions with the shortest
advance warning of four months; the 2-month
rule with threshold and basic 3-month rule both
averagedsevenmonths.
18Leadtimesacrossrules
and across recessions were quite variable, though,
complicating any rules use in policymaking.
For example, prior to the 1980 recession, the
2-month rule gave advance notice of 14 months,
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Table 1
TIMELINESS AND ACCURACY OF VARIOUS CLI RULES OF THUMB
Advance warning of recession (in months)
Start of recession 2-month rule
2-month rule
with threshold 3-month rule
3-month rule
with threshold
May 1960 10 10 9 9
January 1970 7766
December 1973 8874
February 1980 14 14 13 2
August 1981 7766
August 1990 14 -1 -1 -2
Mean (lead time) 10774
Number of episodes without an onset of recession
False signals 9442
Notes: The k-month rule requires the CLI to decline for k consecutive months before a recession signal is sent. The thresh-
oldaddsthecriterionthateachconsecutivedeclinemusteachbeofsufficientsize.Theepisodesoffalsesignalscorrespond
to periods in which one or more monthly false signals were sent without the onset of recession. These periods were
typically less than six months in duration.while the 3-month rule with threshold only gave
two months of advance warning.
19 Over the past
recessionary periods, the difference between the
longest and shortest lead times for any one rule
was roughly a year.
The CLI rules of thumb also appear to be fairly
accurate at predicting recessions. The rules cor-
rectly predicted the onset of most or all of the
recessions but had mixed success in screening
false signals. In fact, the rules that correctly pre-
dicted actual recessions better than other rules
also tended to produce more false signals. For
example, the 2-month rule was sufficiently sensi-
tive to predict every recession but produced at
least twice as many false signals as the other
rules. The other rules with their shorter lead times
issued fewer false signals but missed the 1990-91
recession.
20
Neftçi model. The Neftçi model offered only
marginal forecasting improvement over the CLI
rules, despite its theoretical advantages. The
modelslead-timeandvariabilitywerecompa-
rable to the CLI rules. On average, the Neftçi
model sent an 8-month advance signal of reces-
sion, similar to the average of the CLI rules. In
addition, the models lead times showed consid-
erable variation, with the advance warning from
the Neftçi model fluctuating between 1 month
(for the 1981-82 recession) and 14 months (for
the 1990-91 recession).
The Neftçi model appeared to predict reces-
sions somewhat more accurately than the CLI
rules. Chart 2 clearly shows that the Neftçi
model provided advance warning for all the
recessions, unlike many of the CLI rules. More-
over, its accuracy in spotting actual recessions
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Chart 2
PROBABILITY OF IMMINENT RECESSIONNEFTÇI MODEL
































Pwas achieved with, arguably, fewer false signals
thantheCLIrules.Tobesure,Chart2showsfour
falsesignals,butonlyoneofthemtrulystandsout
as false. The 1966 false signal was clear and per-
sistent, reflecting the pause in economic growth.
In fact, the NBER almost called this period a
recession (Hall). The three false signals that
occurred in 1981, 1984, and 1995 were weak and
short- lived. Discounting these three minor sig-
nals, a business cycle analyst might reasonably
conclude that, when compared with CLI rules of
thumb, the Neftçi model tended to provide rela-
tively long lead times of actual recessions while
sending fewer false signals.
21
Probit model. The Probit model by design can
bespecifiedtopredictrecessionsatanyparticular
forecast horizon, and thus did not provide lead
time information that compares with the CLI
rules of thumb and Neftçis model. The Probit
model results, however, show how predictive
accuracy varies with the forecast horizon (Table
2). At short forecast horizons (one to three
months), the model yielded advance warning of
each recession, except for 1960-61. However,
the model sent false signals in 1966, 1983, and
1988. At midrange horizons (four to nine
months), the model experienced a degradation
of predictive power, as might be expected with a
lengtheningoftheforecasthorizon.Despitepro-
ducing only one false signal, the model failed to
spotthe1960-61and1990-91recessions.Partof
thedropinaccuracywasduetothedeterioration
in the statistical and economic significance of
the CLI in the model at the longer horizons. At
long horizons (10-12 months), the results from
the Probit model confirmed those from earlier
researchbyEstrellaandMishkinandLamy.The
Treasury spread was the only statistically signif-
icant predictor at these horizons. Even though
the model made no false signals, it flashed no
advance warning of the 1960, 1970, and 1990
recessions. These Probit model results also sug-
gestthatbusinesscycleanalystsshouldcarefully
choose the variables for each forecast horizon of
interest.
As with the Neftçi model, further analysis of
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Table 2
TIMELINESS AND ACCURACYPROBIT MODEL
Forecast horizon Missed recessions False signals of recession
1 1960 1966, 1983, 1988
2 1960 1966, 1983, 1988
3 1960 1966, 1983, 1988
4 1960, 1990 1966
5 1960, 1990 1966
6 1960, 1990 1966
7 1960, 1990 1966
8 1960, 1990 1966
9 1960, 1990 None
10 1960, 1970, 1990 None
11 1960, 1970, 1990 None
12 1960, 1970, 1990 Nonefalse signals suggests that distinguishing the strong
signals from the weak ones can help improve the
accuracy of recession predictions. For the Probit
model, the false signals exhibited qualitatively
differentbehaviorthantruesignals.Thefalsesig-
nals were typically short-lived (usual about one
month long), weak, and associated with periods
of economic weakness. While the 1966 false sig-
nal was fairly strong, the other two false signals
came during growth slowdowns in the 1980s. In
contrast, the probabilities of recession prior to
actual recessions were sustained and strong.
GDP forecasting model. The GDP forecasting
model showed some success in forecasting reces-
sions. Table 3 indicates that the model had the
ability to signal imminent recessions roughly
three to five quarters in advance. Because this
model not only signaled imminent recessions but
also provided estimates of a recessions starting
date, accuracy in predicting the correct starting
date can be assessed. In general, the early esti-
mates of a recessions starting date were usually
premature. Table 3 shows that when the model
first flashed a signal of imminent recession, the
model tended to predict that the recession would
start one quarter earlier than it actually did. As
more information became available, the GDP
forecasting model tended to home in on the
actual starting date of the recession.
The accuracy of the GDP forecasting model
shares some of the same weaknesses of some of
the other models. While the models false sig-
nals were limited to 1962 and to late 1996, its
failuretoanticipatethe1990-91recessionatany
forecast horizon raises concerns. To its credit,
the model did predict a GDP decline in the
fourth quarter of 1990, but the 1-quarter decline
was not sufficient to trip the 2-quarter GDP
recession definition.
Stock-Watson model. The Stock-Watson model
generated the shortest average lead times for the
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Table 3
ADVANCE WARNING OF RECESSIONSGDP FORECASTING MODEL
Beginning of recession Early warning (quarters)











forecasting model predicted an imminent recession.
b The third column reports the initial estimate of the recessions start date when the model first signals an imminent reces-
sion. The estimate becomes updated when subsequent data become available.
c The GDP forecasting model did not spot the 1990-91 recession.models considered in this article (Chart 3). Even
though the recession index is designed to identify
recessions six months in advance, the index in
general signaled recessions four to five months in
advance of their onset. In addition, the recession
index usually followed an intuitively plausible
pattern prior to recessions. Typically, the reces-
sion index tended to rise well before the onset of
recession. When the economy was about to enter
recession or was in recession, the recession index
was typically near or above the 50 percent proba-
bility threshold. In contrast, during periods when
recession was not imminent, the recession index
stayed fairly close to 0.
When the model sent signals of imminent reces-
sion, the signals tended to be fairly accurate.
Arguably, the only false signal was a minor one
that occurred prior to the 1981-82 recession. In
October 1980, the recession index signaled the
beginning of recession in April 1981; however,
the recession did not begin until August of that
year. As for missed signals, the model gave no
advance warning of the 1990-91 recession. The
probability of recession did not jump until four
months into the recession, and even then the
probability came close to but did not exceed the
50 percent threshold. Overall, the forecast per-
formance demonstrated the models ability to
mimic NBER business cycle dating practices.
Historical performance using
real-time data
Using the recently published data series, the
previous section presented a favorable assess-
mentofthefivemodels.Theseresults,however,
may exaggerate the predictive power of the





























Precession models because the recently published
data can give the impression that an imminent
recession was obvious when, in fact, data avail-
able at the time would have given a much more
ambiguous picture of economic conditions.
22
This section examines the robustness of the mod-
els predictive performance by evaluating each
model with a real-time data set. The real-time
data set in this article contains data series that
were originally published in each month from
January 1977 to April 1998. For example, the
data set includes the 256 CLI series that were
published during the period. By convention, the
first series in the data set is called the January
1977 vintage, the second is called the February
1977 vintage, and so on.
23
CLI rules of thumb. The CLI rules of thumb
were quite sensitive to revisions in the CLI data.
This sensitivity should not be too surprising
because the CLI is typically subject to consider-
able revision; the CLI data are revised not only as
each component series is revised over time but
also as the number and types of leading indica-
torsthatmakeuptheCLIarechangedtobetter
fit the recession chronology.
24 In terms of fore-
cast performance, both the lead times and num-
ber of false signals varied widely as the data
were revised. For example, Table 4 shows how
the revisions caused the average lead time for
the 3-month rule to vary from zero to nine
months.Intermsoffalsesignals,revisionstothe
CLI data often caused the number of false sig-
nals to decline, thus giving the impression that
the model was more accurate than it was in real-
time. Overall, the results are consistent with the
growing body of research that revisions to the
CLI cause it to appear to be a much better
predictor of recessions than suggested by the
originally published data.
25 These results should
make analysts wary about using CLI rules of
thumb.
Neftçi model. The Neftçi model also showed
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Table 4
REAL-TIME ADVANCE WARNINGCLI RULE OF THUMB
AND NEFTÇI MODEL
Variation is estimates of lead times with real-time data (in months)
Beginning of
recession date Shortest Longest Shortest Longest
May 1960 1857
January 1970 2 7 1 12
December 1973 -4 8 -5 5
February 1980 5 5 5 14
August 1981 -3 12 -2 6
August 1990 -3 12 -1 14
Average -1 9 1 10
Notes: The entries in this table are the shortest and longest lead times estimates for the 3-month CLI rule of thumb and the
Neftçi model. The variation in the lead times is caused by CLI revisions in the real-time data set.
Neftçi model 3-month CLI rulesensitivity to CLI data revisions. Table 4 illus-
trates how data revisions caused the models esti-
mates of lead times to vary widely. For example,
data revisions caused the model to produce
anywhere from a 1-month lag to a 14-month lead
for the 1990-91 recession. The deterioration in
performance can be more clearly seen in Chart 4,
which shows the estimated probabilities from the
Neftçi model using real-time and recently
revised data. The dark lines represent the proba-
bilities from the model using real-time data. The
model gave much shorter lead times when using
thereal-timedatathanwhenusingthemostrecently
revised data (light line). In sum, the sensitivity of
the Neftçi model and CLI rules of thumb raise
serious doubts about their ability to reliably pre-
dict recessions.
Probit model. In contrast, the Probit models
performance using the real-time data was fairly
robusttodatarevisions.Thisresultshouldnotbe
too surprising because the financial market vari-
ables included in the model were not revised or
updated. The revisions in the CLI data could
cause the Probit model results at various horizons
to be sensitive to the real-time data. However, the
effect of the revisions on the performance of the
Probitmodelatmidrangeandlonghorizonswas
modest largely because the CLI played a minor
statistical role in the estimated model. Even at
short horizons, the CLI revisions did not signifi-
cantly change the recession prediction results. The
robustness of the Probit model to data revisions
makes the model attractive.
GDPforecastingmodel.TheGDPforecasting
modelasspecifiedinthisarticlealsoappearedto
be fairly robust to data revisions. The model had
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10 -1 6roughly the same lead time and accuracy with
real-time data as with the recently published data.
However, with real-time data the model did send
false signals of recession in the early 1980s. Those
signals were subsequently eliminated when the
GDP and CLI data were revised. In addition,
these results do not necessarily contradict
earlier research that found important sensitivities
of GDP forecasting to data revisions (Runkle).
The earlier work focused on accuracy in forecast-
ing GDP magnitudes rather than forecasting
recessions.
Stock-Watson model. Evaluation of the Stock-
Watson models performance is complicated
because data limitations preclude direct verifi-
cation of its performance in the face of data
revision. A real-time analysis would require about
a dozen different real-time series, which are not
readily available. An alternative approach to test-
ingtheperformanceinrealtimeistoseehowwell
the model predicted the last recession. The behavior
of the model in the last recession is particularly
important because Stock and Watson created the
model in the 1980s, and as a result the model
faced its first recession test during the early 1990s.
The model failed to call the recession 1990-91
recession in advance of its onset. The failure
prompted mixed reviews of the model. On the
one hand, the failure confirmed the suspicions of
some critics of the model.
26 On the other hand,
and to be fair, many other recession prediction
models missed the last recession. At the very
least, the model sent a confirmatory signal in
November 1990. By that time, the model showed
an 80 percent likelihood that the economy was in
recession.
In response to the models performance, Stock
and Watson (1993) published a detailed analysis
of their models real-time performance in 1990-91.
They found that the yield curve spreads and
exchange rate indicators gave optimistic (and
thus faulty) signals before the recession. Part of
the failure of the financial variables to predict the
downturn was attributed to the fact that mone-
tary policy was not particularly tight during the
period. The miss prompted Stock and Watson to
develop an alternative index to improve predic-
tions in the future.
27 Thus, the jury is still out on
how well the model will perform in the future.
What are the recession models
predicting now?
Although all the models provide useful infor-
mationaboutimminentrecessions,noneofthem
is foolproof. The real-time analysis in particular
showed that some models, such as the CLI rules
of thumb and Neftçis model, can be unreliable.
But it is also true that every recession has been
preceded by signals of imminent recession from
at least one of the modelsand most reces-
sions have been accompanied by many of the
models flashing an advance warning of immi-
nent recession.
Currently, all the models are sending the same
clear signalno imminent recession. The CLI
rules of thumb and GDP forecasting model are
not picking up any hint of imminent recession;
moreover, the Neftçi, Probit, and Stock-Watson
models estimate the probability of imminent
recession to be close to 0. For example, the
recent probability reading from the Stock- Wat-
son model is 3 percent, which indicates only a 3
percent probability that the economy will be in
recession later this year.
III. CONCLUSION
The extraordinarily long expansion in the 1990s
has raised the inevitable question: when is it
going to end? This answer is not only of interest
to policymakers, but to anyone who would be
hurt by such developments. This article offers a
simple answer: not soon. Moreover, this article
provides an approach to address such questions
in the future. All five recession prediction mod-
elscanprovidereliableinformationaboutfuture
recession. To be sure, some of the models have
48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYmissed spotting some past recessions, some have
sent more false signals than others, some were
more accurate at certain forecast horizons, and
someweremorerobusttoreal-timedatathanoth-
ers. So, analysts must carefully interpret the sig-
nals from the models. But, there seems to be
strength in numbers. While each model has its
own idiosyncratic tendencies, recession signals
are clearest when all the models are in agreement.
However, it is important to remember that past
successes do not guarantee future performance.
These models, like all models, are not perfect.
The best way to improve their reliability is to
continue monitoring their performance, learning
more about when they are likely to predict cor-
rectly and when they are likely to err. Ultimately,
the only way to truly increase the reliability of
the models is to test them further. Those models
thataccuratelywarnoffuturerecessionsdeserve
more weight in the prediction. But, if we are for-
tunate enough to avoid future recessions, we
may never know which model is best.
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APPENDIX
This appendix describes technical details
of the estimated recession prediction models
other than the CLI rules of thumb, which
were described in the text, and the Stock-
Watson model, which was not estimated.
Stock and Watson (1989, 1991, and 1993)
describe their model in detail.
28
Neftçi model
The Neftçi model of the probability of reces-
sion can be written as a simple recursive
equation.Recursionmeansthattheprobabil-
ity at time t is a function of the probability at
time t-1 plus other relevant information about
the probability of imminent recession. The
probabilityofimminentrecessioncanbecal-
culated by the following equation:
where Pt is the probability of imminent
recession at time t, Pt-1 is the probability of
imminent recession at time t-1, p
r is the
average transition probability of the econ-
omy entering a recession at time t under the
assumption that the economy was in expan-
sion at t-1, and F
e and F
r are the likelihood
functions that the latest CLI observation
came from an expansionary phase or reces-
sionary phase, respectively.
FollowingDieboldandRudebusch(1989),
the transition probability from expansion to
recession, p
r, is assumed to be independent
of the time elapsed in the phase and set to
0.02 (implicitly consistent with results from
Hamilton).
29 The probability distribution
functions of the CLI data, F
e and F
r, are
modeled as being normally distributed
around mean growth rates of the 3-month
moving average of the CLI during expan-
sionary and recessionary periods. The
3-month moving average of CLI smooths
the wiggles, or noise, in the CLI data.
Tousethismodeltopredictrecessions,the
estimated probability of recession, Pt,i s
compared to a prespecified threshold. Fol-
lowing Diebold and Rudebusch (1989), the
threshold is assumed to be 95 percent, which
by convention for this model represents a
reasonableburdenofproofthatarecessionis
imminent. Once the models probability
exceeds the threshold, a recession is sig-
naled. Then the recursion is reinitialized to
search for another recession. In practice, the
model was reinitialized 18 months after the
trough and a year after a false signal.
Probit model
FollowingMishkinandEstrellaandLamy,
the Probit model is a nonlinear regression
model that translates information contained
inleadingindicatorsofrecessionintoaprob-
ability of recession. The specification in this
article uses the change in the term spread
(TS), change in the corporate spread (CS),
S&P500 return (SP500), and growth of the
CLI (CLI) as leading indicators of recession.
To predict a recession k months ahead, the
model is estimated using lagged information
as represented in the vector
In other words, the nonlinear regression to
assess the probability k steps ahead is
,
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1 This definition can be traced back to early work by Julius
Shiskin, one of the pioneers of empirical business cycle
research associated with the NBER. As Klein and Niemira
note, Shiskins definition is more elaborate than the
2-quarter GDP definition because it also includes duration,
amplitude,anddiffusioncriteria.Hisdefinitionwasbasedon
consecutive declines in industrial production and GDP, a
threshold size of GDP and payroll employment declines and
of unemployment rate increases, and widespread sectoral
employment declines.
2 The NBER deems the GDP definition too sensitive to spe-
cial factors to be reliable. The GDP definition is more likely
to be affected by temporary events than the NBER defini-
tion of economic activity. For example, labor strikes, natu-
ral disasters, unseasonable weather, and shifts in spending
patterns across the year can cause GDP to swing down-
ward. Such temporary swings, however, are not what ana-
lysts would consider a recession. In addition, the GDP
definition tends to be more sensitive to data revisions than
the NBER definition. For example, McNees pointed out
that by the GDP criterion the 1980 recession is in danger
of extinction; a relatively small upward revision of real
growth in 1980:Q3 would eliminate it. Also see Grimm
andParker,Moore(1983)andHall.GDPmeasuresallfinal
goods and services purchased in a quarter. While broad, it
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APPENDIX - continued
This equation states that the probability of
recession is equal to a function of the four
explanatory variables. If the probability is
less than 50 percent, an expansion is more
likely than a recession; if the probability is




The GDP forecasting model is a
4-variable vector autoregression (VAR).
The first equation in the system is the real
GDP equation. Real GDP growth is a func-
tion of lags of GDP growth, changes in the
3-month Treasury bill rate, the core CPI
inflationrate,andthegrowthrateoftheCLI:
The three other equations in the system
describe the dynamics of the interest rate,
inflation, and CLI data. The explanatory
variables for these equations are the same as
intheRGDPequation.Theforecastedvalues
from these three equations are used in the
RGDP equation to forecast future values of
GDP.
The procedure to predict recessions
requires two steps. First, the VAR is esti-
mated using standard regression methods,
and forecasts are made. This is called the
estimation and forecasting step.
31 Second,
the patterns of the GDP forecasts at various
horizons are examined for their conformity
with two consecutive quarterly declines in
GDP. This second step is called the pattern
recognition step. The quarterly business
cycle dates were chosen to be consistent
with the NBER monthly business cycle
chronologies. The timing of the signal
assumes that the GDP data are known at
the end of the quarter for which they are
reported. In practice, the advance, prelimi-
nary, and final releases considerably lag the
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++ + -- - bb b 23 4 500 CS SP CLI tk tk tk ).fails to measure certain important types of economic activity
suchasemploymentorintermediateproductssuchaswhole-
sale trade (Moore and Zarnowitz).
3 While turning point periods are special in a statistical
sense, they also have an important human side. The large
errors associated with forecasting models are often associ-
ated with dire conditions for workers, investors, and con-
sumers. Recessions are periods of acute turmoil, often
accompanied by unemployment, bankruptcy, and social
unrest. The possibility of reducing the human costs associ-
ated with recessions motivates the study of recession predic-
tion models. While some recessions in the past may have
beenunavoidable,othersmighthavebeenavoidedoratleast
might have been made less severe if advance warning of
their onset were known. With such timely information,
policymakers might be able to implement more effective
countercyclical policies, corporations might be able to mod-
erate production and employment swings, and consumers
might be able improve their balance sheets by saving more,
thereby cushioning the ill effects of recessions.
4 The CLI is a weighted average of ten leading indicators:
average weekly hours in manufacturing, average weekly ini-
tial claims for unemployment insurance, manufacturers
new orders for consumer goods and materials, vendor per-
formance measured by slower deliveries diffusion index,
manufacturers new orders for nondefense capital goods,
building permits for new private housing units, stock prices
(S&P 500 common stocks), M2 money supply, 10-year
Treasurybondyieldlessfederalfundsrate,andindexofcon-
sumer expectations. Boshan and Zarnowitz, Zarnowitz, and
recent issues of Business Conditions Indicators provide fur-
ther information.
5 The index is periodically revised to improve its ability to
track the business cycle. In its last major revision, the Con-
ference Board used these criteria to justify modifications to
the index. The new index dropped the change in sensitive
materials prices and change in unfilled orders for durable
goods, and added the interest rate spread between the
10-year Treasury bold yield and the federal funds rate. This
new index differentiates slowdowns in the economy from
true recessions better than the old leading index (Business
Cycle Indicators, January 1997).
6 For example, if the CLI began to decline five months prior
to the onset of recession, a 2-month rule would provide three
months of advance warning; a 3-month rule would provide
only two months of advance warning. In practice, because
the CLI data are released with about a one-month delay, the
3-month rule would give policymakers about a one-month
lead; the 2-month rule would provide a two-month lead.
7 The threshold represents a decline of at least ½ of a stan-
dard deviation below the CLIs average growth rate.
8 Some analysts believe a better leading indicator than the
CLI would include a larger set of variables, different vari-
ables, or alternative ways of combining component series.
Neftçis model could easily be modified to compare the
predictive power of alternative leading indexes with the
CLI. For example, Fredman and Niemira find that certain
financial market variables can outperform the CLI. Also
see Palash and Radecki.
9 Using this model, Estrella and Mishkin explored the
importanceoffinancialmarketvariablesinsignalingfuture
recessions and generally found that interest rate spreads,
such as the yield difference between the 10-year Treasury
bond and the 3-month Treasury bill, provide reliable infor-
mation at fairly long horizons. Analysts have also found
other useful financial variables, such as corporate bond
yield spreads and stock market returns.
10 See Kozicki for a more extensive discussion of the role
of the yield spread in explaining economic activity.
11 The relationship between stock market performance and
business cycle turning points is notoriously imprecise. As
PaulSamuelsonhasoftenbeenquotedassaying,thestock
market has predicted nine out of the last five recessions.
12 To some extent, this article guards against overfitting by
evaluating the forecast performance of the model.
13 The 2-quarter GDP rule is far less accurate than the pop-
ular press has suggested. GDP-based peak dates do not
coincide with the NBER dates. For example, the GDP rule
indicates a peak in May 1974 during the 1973-5 recession,
roughly half a year later than the official NBER date. The
NBER date was missed largely because GDP grew in an
up-down pattern earlier. Such a pattern evades detection
under the 2-consecutive-decline rule. This same up-down
pattern shows up in the early 1960s when the GDP rule
missed the 1960-61 recession. Clearly, the GDP rule is not
perfect, but it is also true that GDP has not declined
two-consecutive quarters without a recession occur-
ringsuggesting that the GDP forecasting model might be
quite conservative in recession prediction.
14 See Stock and Watson (1993) for detailed discussion of
their pattern recognition algorithm. Instead of a 2-quarter
rule, they use a variant of a 17-month rule.
15 Stock and Watson also offer an alternative experimental
recession index. It replaces the interest rate and part-time
work variables with the help-wanted index, average hourly
hours of production workers in durable goods industries,
vendor performance, and manufacturing capacity utiliza-
tion rate. The alternative index is consistent with a tradi-
tional approach that emphasizes quantity rather than
financial variables in predicting recessions.
52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY16 Stock and Watson empirically demonstrated the impor-
tance of interest rate spreads as cyclical indicators. To some
extent, Stock and Watsons research has helped to persuade
theConferenceBoardtoincludeaninterestratespreadinthe
CLI.
17 Both the NBER and GDP dating conventions suffer from
considerable lags in identifying recessions. By construction,
the GDP definition has a 2-quarter lag in recognition. In
practice, the lag is somewhat longer because reports on GDP
are released at least a month after the end of the quarter. The
NBER Dating Committee need not wait for the GDP data to
call a recession, but they do not call a recession until a reces-
sion is well under way. Historically, the timing of announce-
ments from the NBER Dating Committee and of
confirmation from GDP reports roughly coincides. The lags
imply that a recession prediction model which calls the start
of a recession with less than a two-quarter delay still pro-
vides useful information.
18 Experiments using a 4-month rule showed a significant
degradation in advance warnings of recession.
19 The CLI acted somewhat out of character in the period
prior to the 1990-91 recession. During the period, the CLI was
fairly flat, thus complicating the dating with the CLI rule.
20 The CLI rules sent the following false signals: 1962,
1966, 1984, 1985, 1987-88, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995 for the
2-month rule; 1962, 1966, 1989, and 1995 for the 2-month
rule with threshold; 1966, 1987, 1988, 1993, and 1995 for
the 3-month rule; and 1966 and 1995 for the 3-month rule
with threshold.
21 Closer examination of the results for the 1990-91 reces-
sion shows when the Neftçi model tends to outperform the
CLI rules. In the 18 months prior to the July 1990 peak, the
2-monthCLIrulewiththresholdand3-monthrulesofthumb
did not send a signal of imminent recession despite the fact
that the CLI did decline during four out of five months in




revealing than analysis using the most recently revised data.
To be sure, the real-time data were available to
policymakers.However,policymakersmighthavebeenable
to forecast the future revisions because policymakers typi-
cally know more about economic conditions than a small set
of data series would suggest. In such cases, the revised data
would provide a more accurate picture of what was more
generally known at the time than the real-time data.
23 Robertson and Tallman provide more details about the
real-time data set.
24 See, for example, Business Conditions Indicators, June
1997. The Conference Board compares various vintages of
the CLI and draws implications for business cycle dating.
25 These results build on the work of Diebold and
Rudebusch (1991, 1992), Hamilton and Perez-Quiros,
Robertson and Tallman, Swanson, and Ghysels, and
Callan, and Emery and Koenig (1991, 1993) who warn
against using the revised CLI data to assess predictive
accuracy.
26 Zarnowitz (1992, pp. 352-53) raised concerns about the
methodology and the ultimate choice of leading indicator
series. He voiced doubts about the importance of financial
variables, especially interest rate variables, in the
Stock-Watson index. In the past, these measures have been
lessreliablethanothervariablesfoundintheCLItopredict
recessions. For further comments, see Sims, Braun, and
Zarnowitz (1989), and Huh. However, Zarnowitz also
qualifies his comments by noting that most business cycle
modelsfailedtopredictthe1990-91recession.Hesuggests
that this poor performance may have been due to the influ-
ence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The event disrupted
world oil markets and adversely affected consumer confi-
dence, thereby aggravating and accelerating the economic
downturn in August 1990.
27 Stock and Watson examined many alternative financial
and nonfinancial indicators to improve the forecasting
performance of their index. Most alternative financial
indicators only marginally improved the out-of-sample
performance.However,alternativeindicatorssuchashous-
ing starts, weekly employment hours, help wanted adver-
tising, stock prices, and consumer sentiment improved the
out-of-sample performance. Despite out-of-sample
improvement, the in-sample performance of the alternative
was disappointing. A recession index based on these alter-
native indicators is published monthly with the
Stock-Watson index.
28 The five popular recession prediction models can be
lumped together into two broad categories: intrinsic and
extrinsic business cycle models. The CLI rules of thumb,
Neftçi, and Probit models are intrinsic models, and the
GDP forecasting and Stock-Watson models are extrinsic
models. Intrinsic models treat the relationship between
economic activity and business cycle phases differently
than extrinsic models. In intrinsic models, economic activ-
ity and its responses to changing economic conditions
depend on the phase of the business cycle. In other words,
the economy reacts differently in expansions than in reces-
sions.Extrinsicmodels,bycontrast,treateconomicactivity
anditsresponsestochangingeconomicconditionsasbeing
unrelated to the business cycle phase. Recessions and
expansions are merely labels to describe when conditions
are weak and strong.
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ences.Intrinsicmodelstypicallyrelyonnonlinearestimation
methods to capture the complex interrelationship between
economicactivityandthephase.Theextrinsicmodelsdonot
distinguish between economic activity across phases, usu-
ally making the estimation much simpler. But these models
require an extra step to convert the phase-independent esti-
mation results into phase-dependent implications for expan-
sions and recessions. Filardo and Gordon (1999) explore the
differences between extrinsic and intrinsic models.
29Neftçioriginallyspecifiedthemodelwithtransitionprob-
abilities from expansion to recession that varied with the
length of the expansion. Diebold and Rudebusch (1990)
report evidence supporting their assumption.
30Ingeneral,allfourvariablesinthemodelarestatistically
significant.
31 Technically, the parameters are estimated by minimiz-
ing the mean of the squared errors over the sample period.
Itiswellknownthatamodelfittothesamplemaybeapoor
predictor of turning points. Conversely, a good model of
turning points may not do well at forecasting nonturning
point periods. See Kling, Steckler, and Wecker for more
details.
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